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thE roLE oF advancEd cost rEcovEry in 
nucLEar EnErgy PoLicy
by Robert C. Volpe*
INTRODUCTION: NUCleAR POweR AND  
ADvANCeD COsT ReCOveRy
The United States, its electricity providers, policy mak-ers, and environmental advocates, all have a goal of achieving cleaner and more efficient energy. President 
Barack Obama endorsed this goal,1 Congress enacted legisla-
tion towards this goal,2 and states have created various programs 
to achieve cleaner and more cost-effective energy.3 Nuclear 
power offers the means to achieve that goal, but nuclear power 
has a maligned reputation. High-profile disasters and extreme 
construction cost overruns put the U.S. nuclear power industry 
behind other sources of 
electricity in terms of 
consideration and new 
development. However, 
perception is chang-
ing and nuclear power 
is beginning to be re-
recognized as the energy 
source of the future.4
Lawmakers  a re 
encouraging new nuclear 
development. At the fed-
eral level, tax credits and 
loan guarantees provide 
incentives for nuclear 
power.5 At the state level, Advanced Cost Recovery (“ACR”)6 
programs have become increasingly popular.7 ACR programs 
allow utility providers to recover the costs associated with the 
development and construction of nuclear facilities prior to 
the facility going into service. This ultimately lowers the cost 
to ratepayers by reducing carrying charges.8 By reducing the 
financial risk to utility providers, ACR statutes have helped 
encourage development of the first new nuclear facilities in 
the United States in nearly thirty years.9 Current projects 
are limited to a few southeastern states.10 Georgia, Florida, 
and South Carolina lead the way in ACR legislation and new 
nuclear development.
Where ACR has been implemented, it has been challenged. 
 Some consider ACR to be solely for the benefit of utility compa-
nies, at the expense of the ratepayers.11 In Southern Alliance for 
Clean Energy v. Graham12 (“SACE v. Graham”), SACE argued 
that ACR as implemented in Florida was an unconstitutional 
delegation of authority and the associated costs were arbitrary. 
These arguments have been rejected, but that does not make ACR 
policies infallible. State legislators and regulators using ACR to 
encourage new nuclear projects must create and manage ACR 
programs in a way that provides the largest benefit and the lowest 
cost to the public. To do so requires diligence, and adjustment if 
necessary. Without close attention to effective ACR policy, the 
hoped-for expansion of nuclear power could be short-lived.
Other articles have addressed nuclear cost recovery, but this 
is the first one to analyze the decision in SACE v. Graham and its 
effect on nuclear regulatory policy. This is also the first article to 
propose a change in utility ratemaking policy that could further 
the goals of ACR laws. The proposed change creates incentives 
for nuclear projects through an increased allowable rate of return 
on ACR costs, while 
protecting ratepayers 
through more stringent 
cost review.
Section I of this 
article discusses the 
importance of nuclear 
electricity generation in 
meeting energy needs 
and environmental goals. 
Section II provides a his-
tory of nuclear energy in 
the United States from 
its inception as an energy 
source through recent 
federal and state legislation. Additionally, Section II analyzes 
three ACR programs, in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina. 
Section III analyzes SACE v. Graham, a recent decision on 
ACR by the Florida Supreme Court, and the effect of that case 
on nuclear energy policies in Florida. Section III also analyzes 
changes to the Florida cost recovery law and discusses poten-
tial shortcomings. Section IV suggests changes to ratemaking 
policy that will promote nuclear energy development around 
the United States.
In focusing on ACR and recent challenges to it, this article 
analyzes a specific area of energy policy and makes concrete sug-
gestions for improvement. It also strives to show that while ACR 
has withstood legal challenges, this is not enough. Policies must 
adjust and improve. The suggestions made in the final section 
will not shake the foundations of electricity regulation; however, 
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“Modern life requires  
constant and reliable 
electricity, and in the United 
States, the demand for 
electricity is more than any 
other country.”
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the recovery structure suggested may offer a small improvement 
to current policies. At their best, small improvements can create 
large outcomes. Advanced cost recovery has shown its value. 
This article aims to make it more valuable.
The IMPORTANCe Of NUCleAR eNeRGy
Modern life requires constant and reliable electricity, and 
in the United States, the demand for electricity is more than 
any other country.13 Although analysts project that the U.S. will 
become more energy efficient in the future, overall electrical 
consumption is still projected to increase.14 A net increase in 
electrical consumption must be met with a real increase in elec-
tricity production. Utilities and regulators consider many factors 
in determining which sources of electrical generation to pursue; 
among the most important are cost, power availability, and 
environmental interests. This section discusses the importance 
of nuclear power as a component of the energy policy needed to 
meet growing demand and highlights the comparative benefits 
offered by this source.
EconoMic BEnEFits: 
cost and rELiaBiLity
Total electricity 
consumption in the 
U.S. increased 33.6% 
between 1990 and 
2013.15 Consumption 
decreased by 2.37% over 
the past six years since 
the peak of electricity use 
in 2007.16 This decline 
could be attributable to 
the 2007 recession, which 
followed an economic 
boom. Even with the 
recent decrease, overall 
demand for electricity in 
the U.S. is predicted to increase 25% from 2012 to 2040.17 The 
current economic recovery signals that energy consumption will 
increase in the future. To meet the increase in demand, utility 
companies have several options: fossil fuels, including natural 
gas, coal, and oil; renewables, such as wind, solar, and biofuels; 
and nuclear reactors. The cost and reliability of each source var-
ies greatly.
The cost of electricity generation concerns utility providers, 
ratepayers, and government officials. However, sustaining energy 
affordability while trying to achieve the environmental goals of 
lower greenhouse gas emissions and carbon dioxide levels pres-
ents enormous challenges. The U.S. Energy Information Agency 
estimates that among new sources of electricity generation com-
ing online by 2019, new nuclear plants would be among the least 
expensive on a levelized basis.18 The estimated levelized cost of 
electricity is $96.1/MWh for nuclear, a range of $95.6/MWh to 
$147.4/MWh for coal, and $64.4/MWh to $128.4/MWh for nat-
ural gas.19 The estimated levelized cost for wind power is $80.3/
MWh, but the report notes that because of the low capacity 
factor of wind electricity generation, one should be cautioned 
when comparing wind power to a more reliable source.20
A variety of renewable sources of energy are available. 
Among the most popular are wind energy, solar energy, and 
biomass or biomass ethanol. Other sources include geothermal 
energy and wave and tidal energy. These sources are becom-
ing increasingly inexpensive and more efficient, but reliability 
continues to be an issue. Reliability distinguishes fossil fuels 
and nuclear reactors from renewable resources. The reliability 
and efficiency of an electricity source is measured by a source’s 
capacity factor, which is the actual power output of a plant 
compared to the rated nameplate capacity, represented on a 
percentage basis.21 For wind turbines, the reported capacity 
factor ranged between 28.1% and 32.3% from January 2009 to 
January 2013.22 In 2013, wind turbines operated at the highest 
capacity over the five-year period.23 This suggests efficiency 
of wind turbines is increasing, albeit slowly. But there is a 
maximum achievable capacity. Wind is not constant; accord-
ingly, wind power can-
not be constant. Similar 
to wind power, solar 
photovoltaic facilities 
operated at a capacity 
factor of 19.4%.24 Solar 
plants can only generate 
power during daylight 
hours, and then only in 
favorable conditions. In 
stark contrast, nuclear 
facilities generate the 
most consistent and 
reliable electricity of 
any currently available 
source. In the U.S., the 
104 operating nuclear 
reactors have operated at 
an average capacity fac-
tor of 89.6% over the past ten years.25 Nuclear plants operate 
twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, with only incremental 
interruptions for refueling. This is base-load electricity.26 On 
a constantly fluctuating electrical grid, nuclear and fossil fuels 
offer reliability. The most popular renewable resources, wind 
and solar, do not. The unreliability of renewable energy sources 
require fossil-fuel-powered facilities — typically natural gas — 
to fill the gap when renewable sources cannot generate an 
adequate amount of energy to meet demand.27
Cost — mainly capital development costs and variable oper-
ational costs — also distinguishes nuclear reactors from other 
forms of electricity generation. Capital costs (construction and 
financing) account for 71.4% of overall nuclear generation costs, 
while capital costs are only 60.0% and 14.3% of conventional 
coal and natural gas generation costs, respectively.28 Interest 
accrues on any capital, either debt or equity, obtained for con-
struction of a facility. The higher construction cost and longer 
construction periods for nuclear facilities create higher interest 
“Although nuclear energy 
generation is relatively costly 
up front due to its capital 
costs, nuclear plants can 
be efficient over the long 
term, since the fuel is very 
inexpensive compared with 
fossil-fuel sources.”
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and financing costs. This is where utility providers and ratepay-
ers can benefit from ACR. By allowing the utility to recover 
costs during the initial phases of development, financing charges 
are effectively lowered and capital costs decreased.29
In the initial era of nuclear development (1960s through the 
early 1980s), cost overruns plagued the industry. Actual con-
struction costs for plants built during this period averaged 200 
percent over projected cost.30 Given this history, ratepayers and 
policy makers are concerned with potential cost overruns with 
the new generation of nuclear facilities. But over-budget con-
struction has not universally been the case. Construction of the 
V.C. Summer reactors in South Carolina is reported to be under 
budget.31 It may be the case that with modern reactor designs 
extreme cost and timetable overruns are no longer a part of the 
construction of nuclear energy.32
Although nuclear energy generation is relatively costly 
up front due to its capital costs, nuclear plants can be efficient 
over the long term, since the fuel is very inexpensive compared 
with fossil-fuel sources. Variable costs (mainly fuel costs) are 
11.8% of the total levelized nuclear costs, 30.3% of overall con-
ventional coal costs, and 49.1% of overall natural gas costs.33 
This makes natural gas 
electricity more sus-
ceptible to market fluc-
tuations in fuel prices. 
Recent discoveries and 
new technologies such 
as hydraulic fracturing 
have drastically reduced 
the price of natural gas to 
its lowest real price since 
1999.34 In the immediate 
future, this will likely 
keep natural gas electric-
ity costs low, but as a long-term investment, nuclear energy is a 
strong competitor on price and stability due to its low compara-
tive fuel costs.
Incentives like tax credits and ACR were not included in 
the calculations of nuclear energy’s levelized costs.35 These pro-
grams drastically lower costs associated with the development 
of new generation sources. The numbers discussed above swing 
even further in favor of nuclear energy generation when taking 
incentives into account.
EnvironMEntaL BEnEFits: grEEnhousE gas EMissions 
and EnErgy sPrawL
In addition to offering long-term reliability and cost savings, 
nuclear energy provides important environmental benefits. In 
electrical power generation two central factors of environmen-
tal significance are greenhouse gas emissions and use of land 
resources through mining, drilling, or energy sprawl.36 Nuclear 
energy is relatively strong on both fronts.
The primary benefit of nuclear energy over fossil fuels is 
that nuclear power plants do not emit any greenhouse gases 
(“GHGs”).37 Although coal and natural gas are seemingly 
inexpensive fuels, the real cost is in the pollution through GHG 
emissions. The U.S. burned 925 million tons of coal and 26 bil-
lion cubic feet of natural gas in 2013.38 Emissions from burning 
coal and natural gas include sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and 
carbon oxides, all of which contribute to air pollution problems.39 
Increasing the use of nuclear power over fossil fuels can reverse 
that trend. In fact, generation from existing nuclear energy facili-
ties avoided 590 million metric tons of carbon dioxide across the 
U.S. in 2013.40 Because nuclear power plants do not emit GHGs, 
every megawatt of new nuclear will directly reduce air pollution.
This factor is even more relevant considering the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) recent Clean Power 
Plan, a proposed rule to cut carbon emissions from existing 
power plants.41 Many existing coal-fired power plants do not 
meet the EPA’s proposed criteria. In some states, the proposed 
regulations would reduce the use of coal power by up to 90%.42 
To meet the proposed regulations, many states are considering 
more natural gas facilities. Replacing coal plants with natural 
gas while natural gas prices are at historic lows is a cost effective 
option. But complete reliance on one fuel source would leave 
utilities and their ratepayers vulnerable to fluctuations in fuel 
prices. Nuclear power 
facilities would meet the 
EPA’s lower carbon emis-
sions requirements and 
protect against the risk of 
fuel price fluctuations.
In addition to air 
quality considerations, 
generating electricity has 
substantial land-based 
impacts, which vary 
by generation source. 
Energy sprawl, a term 
coined by The Nature Conservancy, denotes the vast amount 
of land needed to produce certain types of energy.43 Renewable 
energy resources such as wind, solar, and biofuel cause signifi-
cant energy sprawl. Energy sprawl is measurable in terms of land 
use intensity, calculating how much land is required to generate 
an amount of electricity, measured in square kilometers per ter-
awatt hour per year (km2/TWh/yr).44 The Nature Conservancy 
determined solar photovoltaic power generation requires 36.9 
km2/TWh/yr, wind generation 72.1, and biomass generation a 
staggering 543.4.45 In comparison, nuclear power generation has 
a land use intensity of 2.4 km2/TWh/yr, the lowest of any power 
source. Like GHG emissions, nuclear power can reduce energy 
sprawl caused by land intensive types of energy.
Nuclear energy is the only reliable source of zero-emis-
sion, always-on, base-load electricity. No other source, whether 
renewable or fossil fuel, can provide reliable electricity with 
zero GHG emissions. Fossil fuels provide cheap base-load 
energy, but with a tradeoff in GHG emissions. Renewable 
sources, such as wind and solar, have no GHG emissions, but 
are not reliable or powerful enough to meet demand, and cause 
excessive energy sprawl.
“The primary benefit of 
nuclear energy over fossil 
fuels is that nuclear power 
plants do not emit any 
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”).”
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Fossil fuels currently account for a significant percentage of 
electricity generation. With improvements in hydraulic fractur-
ing technology and the expansion of shale gas developments in 
the domestic oil and gas industry, the dominance of fossil fuels 
is not likely to change in the near future.46 However, the shale 
oil and natural gas boom will not last forever and in order to 
satisfy the nation’s energy needs and assuage its environmental 
concerns over the long term, nuclear energy will need to play a 
more significant role.47
NUCleAR eNeRGy IN The UNITeD sTATes: 
hIsTORy AND ReCeNT DevelOPMeNTs
Nuclear energy is an important piece of a complex set of 
local, state, and federal programs, incentives, and laws that, 
together, form the U.S. energy policy. Historically, nuclear 
energy has experienced varying levels of public and governmen-
tal support. This section explores the history of nuclear policy 
and development in the U.S. and recent governmental support 
for nuclear energy.
On the heels of World War II and the Manhattan Project, the 
U.S. realized the potential for using nuclear power to generate 
electricity. To stay ahead of the rest of the world, Congress passed 
the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1946.48 Under this 
law, the national nuclear 
program was under the 
control of the military 
and did not permit 
private involvement.49 
Less than ten years later, 
the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 allowed for 
private investment in 
the development of commercial nuclear energy.50 Policy mak-
ers proclaimed that, “electricity generated by nuclear power 
would be ‘too cheap to meter.’”51 However, exposure to liability 
associated with nuclear energy was an initial barrier to private 
development.52 To alleviate these risks, Congress passed the 
Price-Anderson Act of 1957, which gave utility providers limited 
liability for a catastrophic accident.53 As a result of the Atomic 
Energy Act and the Price-Anderson Act, development of nuclear 
power plants boomed through the mid-1970s.54
The so-called “Great Band Wagon Market” ended in 1978, 
and for a period of thirty years, no new combined licenses 
(“COLs”) were approved.55 This dark period for nuclear devel-
opment resulted from a combination of the partial meltdown 
at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania, the Arab oil 
embargo,56 and increased interest rates in the late 1970s that led 
to large cost overruns in construction.57 The 1980s saw massive 
inflation in the cost of construction materials and labor along 
with double-digit financing rates, exaggerating cost overruns in 
coal and nuclear plants that were under construction.58 Safety 
was also a question after the Three Mile Island incident. The 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) responded to safety 
concerns by extending the scope and breadth of its regulation 
and oversight, which fundamentally changed the way the nuclear 
industry operates.59
The timing of the Three Mile Island incident could not have 
been more detrimental to the nuclear power industry. Excessive 
cost overruns in construction of new nuclear facilities and 
decreasing costs of other energy resources such as oil, natural 
gas, and renewables compounded the devastating effects of the 
Three Mile Island event.60
thE “nucLEar rEnaissancE” and nationaL nucLEar 
EnErgy PoLicy
A resurgence of interest in nuclear power has followed this 
dark period in nuclear policy, starting with congressional pas-
sage of the Energy Policy Act in 2005.61 This act provided sig-
nificant tax credit incentives for nuclear generation facilities as 
well as federal loan guarantees and risk insurance assistance.62 
As a result, sixteen applications to the NRC were filed between 
2005 and 2008. The resurgence has earned the nickname 
“Nuclear Renaissance.”63
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included a provision offer-
ing utilities production tax credits to encourage development 
of certain electricity sources, including nuclear.64 The addition 
to the Internal Revenue 
Code titled “The Credit 
for Production from 
Advanced Nuclear Power 
Facilities” allows utilities 
to be eligible for a tax 
credit of up to 1.8 cents 
per kWh for the devel-
opment of new nuclear 
energy plants.65 The tax 
credit provision includes 
several limitations. To be eligible for this credit, a facility must 
be placed into operation prior to January 1, 2021.66 The IRS set 
additional application and construction limits not included in 
the statute: a facility had to obtain its construction and operating 
license by December 31, 2008, and had to begin construction by 
January 1, 2014.67
Aside from the timeline limitations, the statute limits the tax 
credits as follows: credits are only available for the first eight 
years of production at each facility;68 the tax is distributed based 
on a ratio of the facility’s nameplate capacity to the aggregate 
national limitation of 6,000 megawatts;69 annually, the per facil-
ity credit is limited to $125 million per 1,000 MWe capacity;70 
and the credit phases out each year.71
While the tax credit spurred immediate interest in new 
nuclear construction, the law’s time limitations have barred any 
additional utilities from taking advantage of the program. A total 
of five new reactors at three locations met the application and 
construction time limitations to qualify for the credits.72 Even 
for those facilities, delays in construction could cause failure to 
meet the strict timeline requirement to be operational by January 
1, 2021, and thus not be eligible for the tax credit. This pres-
ents a risk to investors relying on the tax credit in their financial 
“In the wake of the 
Fukushima disaster, Japan 
completely shut down all 
reactors in the country.”
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calculations.73 The other limitations discussed above present risk 
and uncertainty to investors and utilities.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided a loan guarantee 
program through the Department of Energy (“DOE”).74 This 
program provides federal government backing to loans for 
advanced nuclear generation facilities. Titled “Incentives for 
Innovative Technologies,” the program requires that guarantees 
be given to “employ new or significantly improved technologies 
as compared to commercial technologies in service in the U.S. at 
the time the guarantee is issued.”75 The secretary of the DOE has 
broad discretion in the approval of guarantees and reasonable 
interest rates.76 If a borrower defaults on loan obligations, the 
DOE will pay the obligations. In return, the DOE subrogates the 
rights to any property acquired pursuant to the guarantee.77 The 
U.S. attorney general will attempt to recover for unpaid debts.78
These loan guarantees provide stability and reduce risk to 
utilities, investors, and lenders. By reducing the risk to lenders, 
the borrower (the utility) 
pays lower interest rates, 
ultimately lowering util-
ity prices to ratepayers. 
This is evidenced by the 
two projects currently 
utilizing loan guarantees. 
Recently, the DOE issued 
$6.5 billion in loan guar-
antees to Georgia Power 
with an additional $1.8 
billion as a conditional 
commitment.79
Another element 
of federal encourage-
ment for nuclear energy 
involves liability caps 
and insurance guaran-
tees. Nuclear energy has 
proved to be very safe. 
There have only been 
three major nuclear reactor incidents worldwide in the sixty-year 
history of nuclear power.80 Compared with other generating 
sources, the chance of a catastrophic event from nuclear energy 
is minuscule.81 The worst nuclear incident in the U.S., Three 
Mile Island, did not cause a single death. In fact, there has not 
been a single death related to radiation in the entire history of 
U.S. nuclear power.82
However, as seen in previous disasters such as Chernobyl 
and Fukushima, when something goes wrong, the results can be 
devastating. For this reason, Congress indemnified nuclear facil-
ities through the Price-Anderson Act.83 Each licensed facility is 
required to carry a minimum amount of insurance and contribute 
to a pooled insurance fund.84 If a disaster were to occur, the util-
ity is strictly liable for damages, to be paid by insurance and the 
Price-Anderson fund. The federal government pays any excess 
liability. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 extends the protection 
of the Price-Anderson Act through 2025.85 This federal backing 
offers security to utilities that would otherwise not be able to 
obtain insurance or risk the occurrence of a major event.
rEcEnt sEtBacKs and advancEs in nEw 
nucLEar PowEr
Two major events in the past five years have dramatically 
affected nuclear energy development: (1) a tsunami in 2011 
caused major damage and radiation containment problems at 
the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan; (2) litigation and politi-
cal controversy surrounding the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste 
repository have halted progress in creating a national high-level 
nuclear waste storage facility for the foreseeable future.
In 2011, an earthquake off the eastern cost of Japan caused 
a massive tsunami that swept into the Tōhoku region of Japan.
This tragic event caused thousands of deaths and billions of 
dollars in damage. The tsunami flooded the Fukushima Nuclear 
Power Plant causing power failures to the main and back-up 
systems. In the wake of 
the Fukushima disaster, 
Japan completely shut 
down all reactors in the 
country. Other countries 
scaled backed or can-
celled their nuclear power 
programs.86 On the other 
hand, the nuclear regula-
tors of the world have 
responded to this event 
with increased safety pro-
grams and cooperation.87 
The United States NRC 
drastically enhanced 
and reconsidered safety 
standards for U.S. 
nuclear facilities after 
the Fukushima disaster.88 
The damage from the 
Fukushima disaster will 
be long lasting, but the nuclear industry may be stronger for it 
in the end.89
High-level nuclear waste, which refers to the spent fuel rods 
from the generation of nuclear power, is currently stored onsite 
at power plants around the country. The Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act of 1982 (“NWPA”) intended to create a national waste 
repository for permanent storage.90 The DOE was charged with 
selecting a site and building a repository for spent nuclear fuel.91 
The law designates that the DOE consider the Yucca Mountain in 
Nevada as the location.92 But due to delays, political battles, and 
litigation, the repository has not been created. The DOE submit-
ted an application to the NRC for construction of the repository 
at Yucca Mountain, but it has yet to be reviewed or approved. 
In the most recent litigation, the D.C. Court of Appeals ordered 
the NRC to follow its statutory mandate and review the petition 
for Yucca Mountain.93 Currently, there has yet to be a facil-
ity prepared to accept high-level waste, and it continues to be 
“Currently, there has yet to 
be a facility prepared to 
accept high-level waste,  
and it continues to be stored  
on-site at power plants.  
Until this issue is resolved, 
spent fuel storage will continue 
to be a cloud of uncertainty 
over the nuclear industry.”
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stored on-site at power plants. Until this issue is resolved, spent 
fuel storage will continue to be a cloud of uncertainty over the 
nuclear industry.94
Although struggles to identify an acceptable repository for 
nuclear waste continue, nuclear reactor technology is becoming 
ever more efficient and safe. The Westinghouse AP1000 reactors 
being constructed at Vogtle and V.C. Summer are significantly 
improved from older generation reactors.95 Even more signifi-
cant are the next generation of reactors. Currently the NRC is 
reviewing five different designs for Generation IV reactors and 
Small Modular Reactors.96  Those reactors are smaller, cheaper, 
more efficient, and create less waste. “Small reactors can’t 
address all the problems standing in the way of more nuclear 
investment, but they can address the biggest barriers — the 
economic ones.”97 The proposed designs minimize high-level 
nuclear waste through recycling and more efficient use.98 Some 
designs even burn the nuclear waste that is sitting dormant at 
facilities across the U.S.99 Despite the hurdles for the nuclear 
industry, technological advances are pushing the industry into 
the future.
To complement this section’s discussion of federal policy 
encouraging the development of nuclear power and recent events 
that have had an effect on a national level, the following section 
addresses state policy. Nuclear power regulation operates as a 
joint federalism scheme. At the federal level, reactor designs and 
facility plans are approved, while state lawmakers and regula-
tors mandate how utilities operate. The following section looks 
at states that are successfully developing nuclear power and the 
regulations that make such development possible.
DevelOPMeNT Of NUCleAR fACIlITIes AND 
ADvANCeD COsT ReCOveRy POlICy IN  
sOUTheRN sTATes
In addition to the federal tax incentives and loan guarantees 
discussed above, several states recently passed statutes to encour-
age new nuclear development.100 Since 2005, at least twenty-two 
states have enacted some form of legislation or regulation that 
supports nuclear electricity generation.101 ACR (also referred to 
as construction work in progress or CWIP) is among the most 
popular.102 Some scholars believe that ACR is essential for new 
nuclear power plants to be economically feasible,103 although 
other scholars believe there are alternative financing mecha-
nisms to achieve the same goals as ACR.104 Notable states on the 
forefront of ACR or CWIP include South Carolina, where South 
Carolina Electric and Gas Company has received a COL for two 
new reactors from the NRC;105 Georgia, where two new reactors 
are under construction at the Georgia Power’s Vogtle Electric 
Generating Plant;106 and Florida, where Florida Power and Light 
(“FPL”) is under review for the approval and pre-construction 
phase for two new nuclear reactors.107
Prior to allowing CWIP in the rate base, the traditional 
approach was to account for construction costs and recover 
those costs in the base rate once the facility was in service. 
This is called allowance for funds used during construction 
(“AFUDC”).108 Allowing utilities to recover construction and 
pre-construction costs while in that phase of development rather 
than carrying those costs over the entire process lowers the total 
costs to ratepayers and the perceived risk of investment in the 
project.109 Lowering the risk and total cost to increase invest-
ment is at the core of ACR.
The majority of new applications for nuclear reactors in 
the country are in southeastern states.110 This section focuses 
on three of them: Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida. For 
an analysis of state regulatory structures that affect the devel-
opment of nuclear electricity generation, these three states 
are ideal. Facilities are currently under construction in both 
Georgia and South Carolina –– the first new nuclear plants 
in the U.S. in nearly thirty years. Furthermore, litigation over 
Florida’s highly controversial ACR program offers ample 
opportunity to analyze challenges to such legislation. This sec-
tion discusses each state’s current nuclear electricity projects 
and respective ACR or CWIP laws.
gEorgia
Georgia leads the charge in the development of new nuclear 
facilities in the U.S. Georgia Power’s Vogtle Units 3 and 4, two 
Westinghouse AP1000 reactors, are currently under construc-
tion.111 Barring a major delay, the new facilities will be opera-
tional by the end of 2018.112 These reactors will generate 1,100 
MWe each, and are the first new reactors in the U.S. in nearly 
thirty years.113 Georgia’s pro-nuclear cost recovery laws are 
among the many financing tools the utility took advantage of for 
this project.
In 2009, the Georgia legislature passed the Georgia Nuclear 
Energy Financing Act, which was intended “to provide for a 
utility to recover from its customers the costs of financing asso-
ciated with the construction of a nuclear generating plant.”114 
It does just that, and with a straightforward approach to cost 
recovery — the utility will recover “costs of financing associ-
ated with the construction of a nuclear generating plant” so 
long as the costs are approved by the Georgia Public Service 
Commission (“GPSC”).115 Financing changes are recoverable 
through CWIP, and are based on the actual costs of debt and the 
authorized cost of equity.116 All costs are to be recovered from 
each customer on an equal percentage basis. 117
The Georgia law gives the GPSC the power to authorize 
accounting treatment for the recovered costs.118 This provision is 
unique to the Georgia CWIP law. It has been suggested that this 
language allows the GPSC to consider the utilities entire balance 
sheet and gives the GPSC the power to require profits from proj-
ects other than the nuclear facility to offset costs of the current 
project before the utility is reimbursed for costs.119
Georgia’s CWIP provision excludes a requirement for costs 
to be “prudent” as found in the Florida and South Carolina laws. 
The original bill included this language, but it was removed by 
the first floor amendment.120 This language may not carry any 
significant weight in application. As seen in the case study below, 
public service commissions of all three states are lenient in 
determining costs that may be recovered through CWIP. Without 
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a floor determination of what is not a prudent cost, it is difficult 
to know whether the prudence review has any real meaning.
Georgia allows costs for cancelled projects, but not within the 
CWIP statute. The law allows a utility to recover actual investment 
costs, along with carrying costs of a cancelled project.121
south caroLina
South Carolina is moving forward with nuclear power devel-
opment of its own. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 
obtained a COL from the NRC in 2012 for two reactors at the 
V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.122 The NRC issued the COL for 
the V.C. Summer reactors one month after issuing the permit for 
the Vogtle project in Georgia.123 Construction on V.C. Summer 
Units 2 and 3 began in March of 2013.124
The Base Load Review Act, passed in 2007, encourages 
new nuclear development.125 It unambiguously states that the 
purpose of the law “is to provide for the recovery of the pru-
dently incurred costs associated with new base load plants . . . 
while at the same time protecting customers of investor-owned 
electrical utilities from responsibility for imprudent financial 
obligations or costs.”126
The Base Load Recovery Act includes a prudency review 
of pre-construction costs.127 Additionally, the law includes a 
provision for review of costs in the event that the utility decides 
to abandon the project after a prudency review.128 In the event 
of an abandoned project, the utility may be able to recover for 
pre-construction costs through AFUDC included in the base 
rate. However, the utility has the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the decision was prudent.129 The 
“recovery of capital costs and the utility’s cost of capital associ-
ated with them may be disallowed only to the extent that the fail-
ure by the utility to anticipate or avoid the allegedly imprudent 
costs, or to minimize the magnitude of the costs, was imprudent 
considering the information available at the time that the util-
ity could have acted to avoid or minimize the costs.”130 This 
provision greatly increases the risk to a utility for abandoning a 
project. It may also incentivize a utility to consider the prudency 
of costs prior to incurring them. This is slightly different from 
the Georgia cancellation provision that does not affirmatively set 
a preponderance of the evidence standard for demonstrating that 
costs were prudently incurred.
FLorida
Florida has four operating nuclear reactors. Two are located 
at the St. Lucie facility in St. Lucie County, and two are located 
at the Turkey Point facility in Miami Dade County. Both facili-
ties are owned by FPL.131 A fifth reactor in Crystal River, owned 
by Duke Energy Florida (“DEF”), temporarily ceased operation 
in 2009 for repairs. Due to damage to the containment structure 
during repairs, DEF announced the plant will not reopen.132 
Between 2009 and 2011, nuclear power accounted for an aver-
age of 11.24% of the total electrical generation in Florida.133
Applications for four new nuclear generating facilities in 
Florida have been submitted to the NRC during the past five 
years. FPL applied for a COL from the NRC for two new reac-
tors at its Turkey Point facility in 2009, Turkey Point Units 6 
and 7.134 The license application is currently under review.135 
Progress Energy (now DEF) also applied for a COL from the 
NRC in 2008 to build two reactors in Levy County.136 Although 
there have been delays in the licensing process, and construction 
plans have been cancelled, DEF continues to seek the COL for 
the Levy facility.137
advancEd cost rEcovEry in FLorida: originaL 
2006 LEgisLation
Following passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Florida, 
along with several other states previously discussed, enacted 
legislation to incentivize the development of nuclear electric-
ity generation. Section 366.93 of the Florida Statute provides 
for recovery of costs prudently incurred in the siting, design, 
licensing, and construction of new nuclear power plants.138 
The goal of the cost recovery statute is to “promote utility 
investment in nuclear . . . power plants.”139 The Florida Public 
Service Commission was charged with establishing rules and 
mechanisms to achieve this goal.140 The rule established under 
this authority is Rule 25-6.0423, Florida Administrative Code, 
known as the Capacity Cost Recovery Clause (“CCRC”).141 
Requirements for the CCRC include annual review for the 
“reasonableness” of projected pre-construction costs and “pru-
dence” of actual pre-construction expenditures.142 To provide 
incentives for investment and certainty, carrying costs were to 
equal the utility’s AFUDC.143 Once in service, ongoing costs 
are recovered through the increases to the base rate.144 In the 
event that the facility was not completed, the statute allowed 
for the recovery of costs incurred in the pre-construction and 
construction phases.145 The legislation was updated in 2008 to 
include “uprate” projects that increase the generating capacity 
of existing nuclear plants and expanded or relocated electrical 
transmission lines.146
Since its inception in 2006, § 366.93 Fla. Stat. has been 
subjected to several legal challenges. Cost recovery statutes in 
Georgia and South Carolina have also been challenged, but the 
courts have upheld the laws in each case.147 The following sec-
tion of this article analyzes one challenge in Florida, Southern 
Alliance for Clean Energy v. Graham, and the subsequent 
amendments to the Florida ACR law and administrative rules 
triggered by the case.
ADvANCeD NUCleAR COsT ReCOveRy CAse sTUDy: 
Southern AlliAnce for cleAn energy v. grAhAm 
(AND sUBseqUeNT leGIslATIve AMeNDMeNTs)
In many areas of the law, it is only through litigation and 
judicial interpretation that the effects of legislation are seen. And 
on occasion, legislation will be modified based on the interpreta-
tion of the courts. This is no different with electricity regula-
tion. Florida Statutes § 366.93 was litigated and subsequently 
amended. The following section analyzes the pertinent case and 
its effect on current cost recovery legislation in Florida.
southErn aLLiancE For cLEan EnErgy v. grahaM
In 2008 the Florida Public Service Commission (“FPSC”) 
granted approval to FPL and DEF for cost recovery for the site 
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selection and pre-construction cost of nuclear power facilities 
at Turkey Point and Levy.148 The FPSC authorized recovery 
amounts for FPL and DEF of $196,088,824 and $85,951,036, 
respectively.149 These amounts included pre-construction costs 
for the proposed nuclear generation facilities as well as “uprate” 
projects at existing facilities. Southern Alliance for Clean Energy 
(“SACE”), an advocacy group that had been at the forefront of 
the anti-nuclear campaign, opposed the pre-construction cost 
recovery allotments, but did not oppose the “uprate” projects.150 
In their complaint, SACE argued that the order was arbitrary and 
unsupported by substantial evidence, and that § 366.93 is uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the separation of powers.151 The 
Florida Supreme Court rejected SACE’s arguments and upheld 
the FPSC’s decision.152
separation of powers arguMent
SACE argued that the statute was unconstitutionally broad 
in its delegation of power to the FPSC — more specifically, that 
the FPSC’s ability to create a rule and mechanism for deciding 
cost recovery imparted a legislative power. The basis for this 
argument was that § 366.93 did not set any standards for the 
FPSC to implement the goal of promoting investment in nuclear 
electricity generation, and that the language for establishing 
a mechanism — “include, but not be limited to” — was too 
broad.153 SACE added that the “prudently incurred costs” lan-
guage in the statute did not give guidance to or put restrictions 
on the FPSC.154 The court, however, reasoned that it was proper 
to give the FPSC rulemaking authority, and that other language 
in the statute gave proper guidance to the FPSC in creating and 
enforcing rules.155 The court found that “prudently incurred 
costs” were defined by a standard of “what a reasonable utility 
manager would have done, in light of the conditions and circum-
stances that were known, or should have been known at the time 
the decision was made.”156
“intent to build” arguMent
The second argument proffered by SACE claimed that 
neither FPL nor DEF demonstrated an “intent to build” as 
required by § 366.93. Rather, the pre-construction activities only 
established an “option to build” the nuclear facilities.157 SACE 
claimed that the statute required a utility to engage in plant sit-
ing, design, licensing, and construction simultaneously to show 
“intent to build.”158 The FPSC had a different interpretation of 
the statute: that the siting, design, licensing, and construction 
phases were not required to occur simultaneously, and in fact 
could not occur simultaneously.159
The FPSC’s interpretation of the statute led the court to con-
clude that “preconstruction activities creating an option to build 
can demonstrate a utility company’s intent to build, and thus its 
eligibility to recover associated costs under the statute.”160 SACE 
argued that this interpretation was arbitrary and unsupported 
by competent substantial evidence,161 and that the “option to 
build” did not create an “intent to build” because “neither utility 
has made a final decision as to whether or not it will actually 
build these proposed new reactors.”162 The court dismissed this 
argument by giving a high degree of deference to the FPSC’s 
interpretation of the statute.163
The court concluded that the statute did not require a final 
decision on the actual construction. Based on § 366.93(6), which 
allows a utility to recover prudently incurred costs even when 
that utility elects not to complete the construction of the nuclear 
facility, it was not the intent of the statute to require a final deci-
sion in order to recover prudently incurred pre-construction 
costs.164 Even with the potential pitfalls of the “option to build” 
approach, the court reasoned that the PSC’s interpretation indi-
cated that an option to build could demonstrate an intent to build 
and fulfill the requirements of the statute.165
probleM with the “intent to build” interpretation
The court thoroughly discusses “intent to build” in SACE v. 
Graham.166 The same language was relied on heavily by SACE in 
their brief and oral argument.167 But the phrase “intent to build” 
did not appear at all in Rule 25-60423, Florida Administrative 
Code, nor in § 366.93, Florida Statutes, prior to the case. The 
question of “intent to build” versus “option to build” originally 
came from the FPSC order approving ACR for FPL and DEF.168 
The court likely addressed this issue with the anticipation of set-
ting precedent in this area. By following the FPSC interpretation 
of the statute and recognizing an intent to build requirement, the 
court essentially added that requirement to the law. The language 
is not within the text of the statute, and to impute such language 
may have been an overreach by the FPSC and the court. As 
discussed in the next section, the Florida legislature amended § 
366.93 and limited the use of “intent to build.”
changes to § 366.93 after sace v. grahaM
After the decision in SACE v. Graham, the Florida legis-
lature passed a bill that amended the cost recovery statute.169 
The amended version of § 366.93 elaborated and clarified the 
requirements for ACR, including the addition of “intent to build” 
language. Four distinct phases of development and recovery 
were defined by the statute: (1) licensing and certification; (2) 
pre-construction phase; (3) construction phase; and (4) com-
mercial in service phase. The amended version of the statute 
retained an allowance for cost recovery in the event that a utility 
did not complete construction.170
Prior to obtaining a COL from the NRC, a utility provider 
may recover costs “related to, or necessary for” obtaining that 
licensing and certification.171 After obtaining the COL, the cost 
recovery statute and capacity cost recovery clause together allow 
utility providers to recover site selection and pre-construction 
costs.172 As defined in the rule, site selection and pre-construc-
tion costs:
include, but are not limited to: any and all costs 
associated with preparing, reviewing and defending 
a Combined Operating License (COL) application 
for a nuclear power plant; costs associated with 
site and technology selection; costs of engineering, 
designing, and permitting the nuclear . . . power 
plant; costs of clearing, grading, and excavation; 
and costs of on-site construction facilities.173
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The utility must undergo an annual Nuclear Cost Recovery 
Clause proceeding for approval of pre-construction costs. In this 
review, the FPSC makes a determination of feasibility of the 
plant and reasonability of the projected costs in order to approve 
pre-construction costs.174 The standard of review is “reasonable” 
and “feasible” and does not include an “intent to build” require-
ment.175 The Florida legislature chose not to adopt the “intent to 
build” standard for normally incurred costs.
In addition to clarifying the phases of development for 
which cost recovery may be used, the amended 2013 cost 
recovery statute placed two time restrictions on recovery of pre-
construction costs if the utility has not begun construction of the 
plant.176 First, ten years after the date the utility receives a COL, 
it must petition the FPSC for cost recovery. The FPSC then 
must determine “whether the utility remains intent on building 
the plant.”177 In this situ-
ation, the legislature 
included the “intent to 
build” language from 
the decision in SACE v. 
Graham. “Intent to build” 
is further defined in the 
statute by a showing 
that “the utility proves 
by a preponderance of 
the evidence that it has 
committed suff icient, 
meaningful, and available 
resources to enable the 
project to be completed 
and that its intent is realis-
tic and practical.”178 This 
section specifies that it is 
for cost recovery “under 
this paragraph,” meaning 
under § 366.93(3)(f).179 
After twenty years from 
the receipt of the COL, 
if construction has not 
begun on the plant, the utility may not receive future costs relat-
ing to the plant.180
The FPSC has the power to review the project prior to con-
struction in order to approve proceeding with the project.181 The 
requirements for the approval of the recovery of construction 
costs are feasibility of the project and reasonable projected costs, 
the same requirements as pre-construction costs.182
Often, an administrative agency or judicial body will give 
specific meaning to a statute or other legislation through inter-
pretation. The legislature is given the responsibility to affirm or 
deny this interpretation by amending the legislation. This pro-
cess was followed in SACE v. Graham and in the order by the 
FPSC. As discussed above, the FPSC order inserted the idea of 
“intent to build” into § 366.93 and the Rule 25-6.0423 annual 
reporting requirement.183 The Florida Supreme Court, giving a 
high degree of deference to the FPSC’s interpretation, confirmed 
the “intent to build” requirement.184
The Florida legislature, seemingly in reaction to SACE 
v. Graham, enacted an amendment to §366.93 in 2013. This 
amendment adopted the FPSC’s idea of an “intent to build” 
requirement; however, it was only included in § 366.93(3)
(f), which is specific to a situation where the utility has not 
begun construction of a plant within ten years of receiving the 
COL.185 “Intent to build” is not a requirement for pre-construc-
tion or construction phase cost recovery under § 366.93(3)(c) 
or (e). The 2013 amendment separated the requirements for 
each phase, and specifically stated, that for the pre-construction 
and construction phases, the requirements for cost recovery are 
that the plant remains “feasible” and the projected costs are 
“reasonable.”186 Essentially, the legislature accepted the “intent 
to build” requirement 
but narrowed it to cer-
tain situations where the 
project is stalled in the 
pre-construction phase.
florida public 
service coMMission 
ruleMakings
Since the FPSC 
is charged with issu-
ing rules to uphold the 
purpose of the cost 
recovery statute, it was 
required to address the 
2013 amendment.187 
Based on the decision 
in SACE v. Graham and 
the 2013 amendment to 
§ 366.93, the FPSC has 
issued a proposed rule 
to “implement changes 
to Section 366.93, F.S., 
enacted by the 2013 
Legislature.”188 In this 
proposed amendment to Rule 25-6.0423, the PSC added a 
requirement of “intent to build” to the annual report and 
application for cost recovery.189 This mirrors the language of 
FPSC Order No. PSC-11-0547-FOF-EI and the language of 
SACE v. Graham.190 This expands beyond § 366.93, however, 
which requires only a showing of “intent to build” for a facil-
ity that has been in the pre-construction phase for more than 
ten years.191 The FPSC’s proposed requirement is a showing of 
intent to build for every year regardless of the amount of time 
the utility has had a license.192
florida public service coMMission levy  
facility decision
Despite recent clarification of standards through court 
decisions, legislation, and administrative rules, nuclear cost 
recovery is not achieving its goals entirely, as evidenced by the 
“Even with the addition  
of “intent to build” in the 
statute, utility providers  
have a very low level of 
liability for canceling 
a project, and therefore 
advanced nuclear cost 
recovery is not meeting  
the legislative intent of 
promoting investment in 
nuclear electricity generation.”
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controversy over the Levy nuclear generating facility.193 The 
FPSC confirmed that in the event the reactor construction is can-
celled, a utility can still recover the planning and licensing costs 
as stipulated in the statute.194 Even with the addition of “intent 
to build” in the statute, utility providers have a very low level of 
liability for canceling a project, and therefore advanced nuclear 
cost recovery is not meeting the legislative intent of promoting 
investment in nuclear electricity generation. The following sec-
tion of this article proposes a change in the administration of 
ACR or CWIP schemes that uses the rate of return to the utility 
to meet the goal of investment in new nuclear generating plants.
Several legislators in Florida are attempting to repeal the 
Florida cost recovery statute. In the 2014 session, House Bill 
No. 4001 proposed to repeal the program entirely.195 The bill 
died in the Energy and Utility Subcommittee. Given the con-
troversy surrounding the Levy County facility abandonment, 
future attempts to repeal the statute and dismantle ACR in 
Florida are possible.
Advanced cost recovery has been thoroughly discussed and 
analyzed in this article. The following section attempts to take 
the lessons learned from this analysis and offers a suggestion 
to improve the outcome 
of and participation in 
ACR programs.
PROPOseD ChANGe 
TO ADvANCeD COsT  
ReCOveRy 
ReGUlATION
State governments 
across the country 
have taken an affirma-
tive step to incentivize 
development of nuclear 
electricity generation through ACR legislation. As discussed 
above, there have been challenges and flaws found in ACR laws. 
Fortunately, however, they can be improved. By adding incentive 
to the rate of return on the rate base (“ROR”)196 or implementing 
a tiered rate of return (“Tiered Rate”) utilities could be further 
encouraged to continue nuclear development and utilize ACR. 
This section will use the Florida ACR law as a guide, but the 
suggestions could be applied to any ACR or CWIP scheme.
Cost recovery should be more purposeful in the encourage-
ment of new nuclear development, especially in the early stages 
of development and construction of a nuclear facility. Currently, 
ACR costs are recovered at the approved AFUDC rate.197 This 
applies to all costs in the pre-construction and construction 
phases.198 In a typical FPSC ratemaking case, the ROR is cal-
culated based on the utilities actual costs and an allowed rate 
or return. The FPSC looks at tolerance for risk associated with 
other utilities and the specific utility making the application. 
It then considers other investments with similar risk and bases 
the rate of return accordingly. In this process, the FPSC con-
siders the utility as a whole, with the entire mix of generating 
sources.199 No one plant is given a rate of return. This process 
could be amended for pre-construction and construction costs 
under ACR.
In the ratemaking case, costs associated with ACR are 
isolated and analyzed separately from other costs. As seen in 
SACE v. Graham, CWIP costs are securitized as “prudent” and 
cannot be included in the rate base unless the utility makes an 
affirmative showing that the project is feasible and the costs 
are reasonably incurred.200 A similar analysis of costs occurs in 
other states. Once costs approved under ACR are included in the 
rate base, the utility still itemizes the costs on each customer’s 
individual utility bill. Typically, the portion of the bill associated 
with ACR is a separate line item, like fees and taxes. Since the 
FPSC already separates these costs for purposes of ratemaking, 
it would be possible to do likewise with the allowable ROR on 
these costs.
Regulators have used ROR incentives in the past to encour-
age behavior by utility companies. One example of this type of 
incentive is a rate increase for environmental compliance. Where 
a utility took measures to be more environmentally compliant, 
they were rewarded with an increase in the allowable rate. This 
same process could work to encourage participation in ACR. 
When a utility embarks 
on the process of devel-
oping new nuclear power, 
the associated costs could 
be given a higher ROR.
Under this proposed 
program, lawmakers 
run the risk that increas-
ing the ROR would 
have a disincentive 
effect, referred to as the 
Averch-Johnson effect, 
essentially encouraging 
utilities to increase their costs in order to gain a higher return. 
Alternatively, utilities may simply be careless with costs where 
a higher return is possible. The prudency review can prevent this 
outcome. PSCs can deny the recovery of costs where wasteful 
or irresponsible spending occurs. Lawmakers and regulators 
can facilitate a balance by increasing the incentive to use ACR 
to gain a higher ROR on associated costs, but simultaneously 
controlling costs through a prudency review.
A tiered rate, with separated ROR for costs incurred in each 
stage of the project, could also serve to further the purposes of 
the ACR statute. Cost recovery would be more effective if incen-
tives were higher in the construction phase and lower in situa-
tions where, for example, the project is delayed or postponed, 
which happened with the DEF Levy facility.201
Under current legislation, a utility would recover all costs 
at a set AFUDC rate. ACR merely allows the utility to recover 
costs earlier than otherwise possible. But under a tiered rate 
scheme, the profit margins for the pre-construction phase would 
be greater than the AFUDC. This would incentivize the utility 
to pursue nuclear power projects. Costs associated with the con-
struction phase, which historically have been the biggest hurdle 
“Where a utility took measures 
to be more environmentally 
compliant, they were rewarded 
with an increase in the 
allowable rate.”
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for development, would have an even higher profit margin. Once 
the facility is online, the profit margin would be readjusted to a 
typical ROR. In a case of recovering costs for a facility that is 
not completed, or canceled, like the Levy project, the set recov-
ery rate could be below the AFUDC to discourage cancellation 
of a project. To balance the risks, utility providers could recover 
the costs involved, but with lower profit.
There are some potential downsides to this plan. For 
instance, the increased incentive in the pre-construction phase 
could cause the utility to cancel the project early and recover 
the costs at the higher margin. Or, the utility could bundle its 
costs in the construction phase in order to recover a higher 
profit margin on more costs. One solution to this problem is 
accountability through regular reporting, based on a more 
stringent “reasonable and feasible” standard. Public Service 
Commissions should move away from the “intent to build” 
standard while making more stringent decisions on what is 
reasonable and feasible. Either the proposed tiered rate ACR or 
the simpler incentive rate would be a step toward achieving the 
goal of improved ACR laws.
CONClUsION
Nuclear power has emerged from a dark age of unpopu-
larity and neglect and is experiencing a renaissance. Indeed, 
given nuclear energy’s dramatic environmental and reliability 
advantages over other sources of electricity, it is surprising the 
resurgence has not been greater. But costs and financial risk 
still present daunting obstacles. The federal government has 
shown support for nuclear through loan guarantees, tax incen-
tives, and risk mitigation, while several states have attempted 
to encourage nuclear power through ACR legislation. The 
Vogtle, V.C. Summer, and Turkey Point projects are directly 
attributable to ACR.
The analysis of SACE v. Graham and the three state statutes 
revealed strengths of ACR and weaknesses that can be improved. 
Adjusting the rate of return is only one possibility. Nuclear power 
can help achieve a stronger energy future; ACR is a vehicle to 
make that happen. 
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